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JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the 
Utah Code Annotated and pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss entered as a final judgment by 
the trial court. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Section 78-2a-
3(2)0')-
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted the Masoud Shafizadeh's Motion to 
Dismiss/Summary Judgment based on the language of the Commercial Lease Agreement 
which exculpated Mr. Shafizadeh from any injury or damage to any person and property, and 
which required the Bonnemas to indemnify and hold Mr. Shafizadeh harmless for any such 
damage or injuries, as well as requiring the Bonnemas to provide insurance coverage for 
property damage and fire insurance on the leased premises in the amount of at least SI 
million. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly granted Mr. Shafizadeh's motion for 
attorneys' fees based on the express provisions of the Commercial Lease Agreement, which 
required the non-prevailing party to pay the prevailing party's costs and attorneys for any 
legal action concerning the Commercial Lease Agreemeent. 
3. Whether Mr. Shafizadeh is entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred in 
defending the appeal. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. An appellate court reviews the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss 
for correctness, accepting as true the factual allegations of the complaint and drawing all 
inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, ^ 6. 
If the Court decides that Mr. Shafizadeh's motion should be considered a motion 
for summary judgment, then an appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness, affording no special deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Girbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). The reviewing court 
may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even 
if it is one not relied upon below. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1993). 
2. Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, which an 
appellate court reviews for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 
1998). 
3. There is no cited standard of review for whether an award of attorney's fees 
should be awarded on appeal. However, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the mle of 
law that a provision for payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees 
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to 
enforce the contract. Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 
408-409 (Utah 1980). 
2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an action arising out of a fire to a leased premises. (R. 2-3.) The lessees, 
Steve and Tori Bonnema, leased portions of a building from Masoud Shafizadeh. (R. 2.) 
The parties memorialized their agreement in a document titled "Commercial Lease 
Agreement." (R. 8-14. See, Appendix A.) On October 11, 2001, a fire damaged the 
premises, and the Bonnemas claimed that they lost personal business property and claim 
loss of use damages. (R. 3.) 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
The Bonnemas filed an action against Masoud Shafizadeh on August 22, 2002, 
alleging that he negligently "allowed" a fire to occur at the leased premises. (R. 1-45.) 
The Bonnemas' Complaint alleged causes of action for 1) Breach of the Commercial 
Lease Agreement, 2) Negligence, and 3) Res Ipsa Loquitur. (R. 1-45.) 
Mr. Shafizadeh responded with a motion to dismiss, stating that the hold harmless, 
indemnification, release and insurance provisions contained in the parties' Commercial 
Lease Agreement barred all of the Bonnemas' claims as a matter of la.,. (R. 108-135.) 
Oral Argument on the motion was heard by Honorable Robert K. Hilder on February 20, 
2003. (R. 315.) Following arguments of counsel, the court ruled that Mr. Shafizadeh's 
motion to dismiss was well-taken and granted the motion. (R. 238-241.) Counsel for Mr. 
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Shafizadeh prepared an order on the motion to dismiss which was signed by the court on 
April 16, 2003. the order was amended by Judge Robert K. Hilder on July 3, 2002. 
(R. 238-241) 
On March 21, 2003, Mr. Shafizadeh filed a motion for attorney's fees, (R. 178-
197), which was granted by the trial court on September 26, 2003. (R 280-282.). The 
Court granted Mr. Shafizadeh reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $1,756.98. (R. 
286-287, 280-282.) 
C. DISPOSITION OF THE COURT, 
The trial court granted Mr. Shafizadeh's motion to dismiss on February 20, 2003. 
The also granted a motion for attorney's fees in favor of Mr. Shafizadeh in the amount of 
$1,756.98. (R.286-87.)1 
A. Statement of Facts 
On February 25, 2000, the Bonnemas and Masoud Shafizadeh entered into a lease 
agreement for the rental of certain property located at 8029 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 
84093. (R. 8-14. See, also Commercial Lease Agreement attached in Appendix A.) The 
Lease Agreement defines the "Lessee" as "Steve and Tori Bonnema." (R. 8.) Steve and 
Tori Bonnema's signatures are found on the bottom Page 6 of the Commercial Lease 
Agreement. (R. 13.) The Lease Agreement defined the "Lessor*'as "Masoud 
Shafizadeh." (R. 8.) 
]The Bonnemas' representation that the trial court awarded $7,500 in attorneys 
fees is incorrect. See, Appellant's Brief at 9. 
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On October 11, 2001, a fire occurred at the leased premises which the Bonnemas 
allege destroyed much of their personal business property and allegedly caused business 
losses and property damage. (R. 3.) The Commercial Lease Agreement was in effect at 
the time of the fire, and was effective from March 1, 2000 until February 28, 2003. (R. 
8.) In the allegations contained in their Complaint, the Bonnemas did not allege that Mr. 
Shafizadeh caused the fire. (R. 1-45.) Rather, the Bonnemas claimed that Mr. 
Shafizadeh "acted negligently by allowing the fire to occur . . ." (R. 3.) 
The Lease Agreement contained a provision under which the Bonnemas agreed 
that Mr. Shafizadeh would not be held liable for any injury or damage resulting to persons 
or property in or about the rented premises: 
Lessor shall not be liable to the Lessee for any injury or damage that may 
result to any person or property by or from any cause whatsoever in or about 
the premises. 
(R. 10.) 
Paragraph 13 of the Commercial Lease Agreement also required the Bonnemas to 
indemnify, hold harmless and defend Mr. Shafizadeh against any claims occurring in or 
about the premises as follows: 
Lessee shall indemnify, hold harmless and defend Lessor against and from 
any and all claims whatsoever occurring in or about the premises from any 
cause. 
(R. 10.) 
The Bonnemas also promised in the Commercial Lease Agreement to maintain 
property damage and fire insurance on the leased property with insurance limits of at least 
5 
$1 million covering the leased premises and personal property for the full replacement 
value of such property. (R. 10.) Those contractual promises are provided, as follows: 
Lessee shall throughout the term of this Rental Agreement, at its sole cost 
and expense, provide and keep in force with responsible insurance 
companies satisfactory to Lessor and to any mortgagee under a mortgage or 
deed of trust constituting a lien upon the demised premises, public liability 
and property damage insurance. 
The liability limits of all said insurance shall be in the aggregate limits of at 
least one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars for any accident resulting in bodily 
injury to or the death of one or more persons, and consequential damages 
arising therefrom and liability or damage to all the property in the leased 
premises as well as liability to any employees or servants of Lessee or to 
any other person whomsoever arising out of or in connection with the 
Lessee's use of the rented premises or the condition of the rented premises. 
Fire and extended coverage insurance, including Vandalism and Malicious 
mischief endorsements, covering all trade fixtures, furniture, furnishings 
and equipment located on the leased premises, providing protection to the 
insurable value thereof, but no more than one hundred (100%) percent of 
the replacement value thereof. 
Said policies of insurance shall name Lessor and the holder of such 
encumbrances with a certificate of insurance, executed by the insurer 
involved, which shall contain, in addition to the matters customarily set 
forth in such a certificate under standard insurance company practice an 
understanding by the insurer to give the Lessor and the holder of such 
encumbrances ten (10) days prior written notice of any cancellation, change 
in scope or modification of coverage of such policies. Lessee is to furnish 
Lessor with a Certificate of Liability Insurance within 30 days after 
commencement of this Agreement. 
(R. 10.) 
Following the fire, it came to light that the Bonnemas did not purchase the correct 
type of insurance and the insurance obtained by the Bonnemas did not cover some of the 
damages resulting from the fire. (R. 148, 315, p. 2-8) In violation of the provisions of 
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the Commercial Lease Agreement, on August 22,2002, the Bonnemas instituted an action 
against Mr. Shafizadeh alleging that he negligently allowed a fire to occur at the leased 
premises. (R. 1-45.) The Bonnemas' Complaint alleged causes of action for 1) Breach of 
the Commercial Lease Agreement, 2) Negligence, and 3) Res Ipsa Loquitur. (R. 1-45.) 
Mr. Shafizadeh filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs claims on or about 
September 4, 2002. (R. 108-135.) The matter was fully briefed by the parties and a 
hearing was held before Judge Robert K. Hilder on February 20, 2003, in which the Court 
heard oral arguments from both the Bonnemas' counsel and Mr. Shafizadeh's counsel. 
(R. 315.) Following arguments of counsel, the Court ruled that Mr. Shafizadeh5s motion 
to dismiss was well-taken and granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds that: 
a. The Court finds as a matter of law that the Commercial Lease Agreement, 
in Section 13 of the Agreement, entered into between Plaintiffs and Mr. 
Shafizadeh contained a valid, clear and unambiguous indemnification 
agreement under which Plaintiffs contracted that Defendant would not be 
liable to Plaintiffs for any injury or damage resulting to any person or 
property from any cause on the leased premises, and, that the Plaintiffs 
contracted to indemnify, hold harmless and defend Mr. Shafizadeh from 
any and all claims whatsoever occurring in or about the premises from any 
cause. 
b. The Court finds that even if the indemnification language is deemed 
insufficient the Commercial Lease Agreement, in Section 13 of the 
Agreement, contained a valid, clear and unequivocal agreement requiring 
Plaintiffs to purchase insurance coverage to cover Plaintiffs and Mr. 
Shafizadeh for all damages resulting from the fire which allegedly caused 
the Plaintiffs' damages, which fire is the subject of this action. The Court 
further found that Plaintiffs breached their contractual agreement to 
purchase insurance which would have covered all of their alleged damages. 
Because the Plaintiffs' breached the agreement to purchase insurance, they 
stepped into the position of the insured, and could not properly maintain any 
claim against Mr. Shafizadeh. The Plaintiffs' breach of the Commercial 
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Lease Agreement barred any claim that Plaintiffs could otherwise maintain 
against Mr. Shafizadeh. 
(R. 238-241.f 
Paragraph 22 of the Commercial Lease Agreement contained a provision for 
attorneys fees which states as follows: 
If Lessor or Lessee shall bring any action for any relief against any 
other arising out of this Agreement, or to recover possession of said 
property, whether such action progresses to judgment or not, the losing 
party shall pay to the successful party, in addition to other relief 
granted, its costs and expenses including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(R. 12. Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Shafizadeh was adjudged to be the successful party and therefore, the district 
court awarded Mr. Shafizadeh $1,756.98 in attorney's fees incurred in defending the 
Bonnemas' action. (R. 287.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Commercial Lease Agreement signed by the Bonnemas contains various 
contractual provisions which bar all of the Bonnemas5 claims against Mr. Shafizadeh. 
The contract contains release, indemnification, hold harmless, and defense language 
prohibiting any claims by the Bonnemas. Each of those provisions is clear, unambiguous 
and unequivocal. These provisions alone would be sufficient to bar the Bonnemas claims 
against Mr. Shafizadeh, and ther trial court so ruled. 
2
 The emphasized language contained in Paragraph 2 of the Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was handwritten in by Judge Robert Hilder on July 3, 
2002. 
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In addition, the Commercial Lease Agreement also contains a provision requiring 
the Bonnemas to purchase insurance, to cover themselves and Mr. Shafizadeh, in an 
amount sufficient to cover the entire premises and all of the Bonnemas' personal property 
within the building. The contract expressly required the Bonnemas to purchase insurance 
to guard against the risk of fire. However, the Bonnemas admitted that they failed to 
procure the required insurance. This was a material breach by the Bonnemas of the 
Commercial Lease Agreement, and required them to step into the position of the insurer 
and accept the risk of loss themselves. The Bonnemas' failure to procure the required 
insurance also operated to bar any claims they might have against Mr. Shafizadeh. 
The Bonnemas' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and their request for a 
new trial, (which they attempt to intertwine with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur), are not 
properly before the Court, as they are not appealable issues on which the trial court made 
a final ruling. Moreover, the issues do not mandate a reversal of the trial court's ruling 
because the parties chose their remedies, and contemplated that the Bonnemas would bear 
the risk of any damage to the property through the clear and unequivocal indemnification 
and insurance provisions of the Commercial Lease Agreement. 
Mr. Shafizadeh was correctly awarded a reasonable amount of attorney's fees 
under the express terms of the Commercial Lease Agreement, as he was the prevailing 
party in an action based on the contract. Under Utah law, Mr. Shafizadeh is entitled to all 
of his attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal, and requests that the Court 
remand the case to the trial court solely for a finding of an additional reasonable amount 
9 
of attorney's fees incurred by Mr. Shafizadeh in connection with this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE 
DEFENSE, INDEMNIFICATION AND HOLD HARMLESS 
PROVISIONS IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASE AGREEMENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW AND DISMISSED THE BONNEMAS5 CLAIMS 
AGAINST MR. SHAFIZADEH. 
The district court correctly ruled that the Commercial Lease Agreement entered 
into by the Bonnemas and Mr. Shafizadeh precluded the Bonnemas' claims as a matter of 
law. The resolution of the motion to dismiss involved the district court's interpretation 
and application of the plain and unambiguous language of the Commercial Lease 
Agreement to the facts, as alleged by the Bonnemas' Complaint. The issues raised by Mr. 
Shafizadeh in his Motion to Dismiss were questions of law, and the trial court correctly 
addressed and correctly ruled upon those issues. The core issue before the trial court was 
whether the hold harmless, indemnification, and insurance provisions contained in the 
Commercial Lease Agreement barred all of the Bonnemas' claims against Mr. 
Shafizadeh. The district court correctly answered those questions in the affirmative and 
dismissed the action. 
In rendering its decision and judgment, the district court properly applied Utah 
law, which recognizes that contracting parties may validly bargain to limit their liability 
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under contract.3 See, Zollman v. Meyers. 797 F.Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992)(applying Utah 
law). Specifically, Zollman recognized that ". . . it is not the public policy of the State of 
Utah to prohibit a business . . . from seeking to limit its liability." Id., 797 F.Supp. at 927. 
In fact, Utah's appellate courts have held that such limit of liability agreements are 
enforceable when the broad sweep of the language employed in the agreement clearly 
covers those instances in which a party may be negligent. Russ v. Woodside Homes, 
Inc.. 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1995). 
In this case, there is no evidence that Mr. Shafizadeh caused the fire, and the 
Bonnemas did not allege that Mr. Shafizadeh caused the fire in their Complaint. At best, 
the Bonnemas alleged that Mr. Shafizadeh "allowed" the fire to occur. However, even 
assuming that Mr. Shafizadeh negligently caused the fire, the language of the Commercial 
Lease Agreement operates to bar their claims against Mr. Shafizadeh as a matter of law. 
The Bonnemas and Mr. Shafizadeh entered into the Commercial Lease Agreement in an 
arms length transaction between two business owners. Under the defense, 
indemnification, hold harmless, and the insurance provisions contained in the contract, 
the Bonnemas' claims fail as a matter of law. 
In order to evaluate the standards under which indemnification provisions of a 
3The Utah Supreme Court in Hawkins v. Peart. 2001 UT 94,U 9, stated that most 
courts allow release of liability for prospective negligence, except where there is a strong 
public interest in the services provided. 
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contract should be held to be enforceable, a more detailed review of Russ v. Woodside. 
905 P.2d 901, 905 (Utah App. 1995), is appropriate. In Russ, this Court described three 
general circumstances in which parties may obtain contractual releases from liability for 
negligent acts: (1) where injuries have already occurred and one party releases the other 
from liability for those injuries, 
(2) where one party agrees to indemnify for liability for future injuries, and (3) where one 
party agrees to release the other from liability for future injuries. See Russ, 905 P.2d at 
904- 05. The second and third categories require a clear and unequivocal expression of 
the intent to indemnify or release according to Russ. See id. However, this Court made it 
clear that mit is not necessary that the exculpatory language refers expressly to the 
negligence of the indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify can be 'clearly 
implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement.'" Id at 905 (quoting 
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990). 
Thus, the clear rule from Russ is that when the intent to indemnify and release 
another party is clearly and unequivocally expressed in a contract, Utah courts will 
enforce those provisions. In Russ, the Court of Appeals found that the release entered 
into by the parties, which stated that Woodside would be held harmless for "any and all 
claims, damages, loss and expenses," and which provided that Woodside would be held 
harmless w'to the fullest extent permitted by law . . . for any death, accident, injury, or 
other occurrence," clearly and unequivocally established the parties' intent to avoid 
Woodside's potential liability. Therefore, the Court held that any negligence claim 
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against Woodside was barred as a matter of law. 
In the present case, the language of the Commercial Lease Agreement conforms to 
the standard for indemnification agreements set out in Russ. The district court expressly 
found a clear and unequivocal expression of intent on the part of the Bonnemas to 
indemnify and hold Mr. Shafizadeh harmless from the claims that they raised in their 
Complaint. In the hearing held on February 20, 2003, Judge Hilder stated his findings 
with respect to the sufficiency of the indemnification and hold harmless language 
contained in the Commercial Lease Agreement, as follows: 
I think the problem is you didn't have a sufficient [insurance] policy but 
that's not the landlord's fault. I do understand your argument but I also 
think there's a place for motions to dismiss and there's a place for motion 
for summary judgment and I believe the language here, the indemnity 
language, is probably sufficient under the case law as it has evolved 
over the last 20 years since Union Pacific to shift the responsibility. 
(R. 315, p. 17 of Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss. Emphasis added.) 
More importantly, the Commercial Lease Agreement on its face conveys a clear 
expression of the intent on the part of the Bonnemas to release, hold harmless and 
indemnify Mr. Shafizadeh, and thus avoid his liability. Specifically, the Commercial 
Lease Agreement provides, with respect to releasing Mr. Shafizadeh from any injury or 
damages, as follows: 
Lessor shall not be liable to the Lessee for any injury or damage that may 
result to any person or property by or from any cause whatsoever in or about 
the premises. 
(R. 10.) Paragraph 13 of the Commercial Lease Agreement also required the Bonnemas 
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"any and all" damages, liabilities and injuries. 
The federal district court determined that the FAA was not sufficiently clear and 
unequivocal to require Jones to indemnify UP&L against plaintiffs claims.6 However, 
the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the decision on certification and reached a different 
result. The supreme court began its analysis by stating that a party is contractually 
obligated to assume ultimate financial responsibility for the negligence of another only 
when that intention was "clearly and unequivocally expressed." id., 793 P.2d at 370. The 
court recognized the growing trend to relax some of the strict rules of construction in such 
agreements, and evaluated the identification agreement at issue "according to the 
objectives of the parties and the surrounding facts and circumstances" in order to 
determine the enforceability of the agreement. IcL The FFA plainly showed that Jones 
contracted to indemnify UP&L from "any and all liability" arising from the attachment of 
cable equipment to utility poles. Specifically, the agreement stated as follows: 
Licensee [Jones] shall indemnify, protect, and save harmless Licensor 
[UP&L] from and against any and all claims, demands, causes of action, 
costs or other liabilities for damages to property and injury or death to 
persons which may arise out of or be connected with the erection, 
maintenance, presence, use or removal of Licensee's equipment, or of 
structures, guys and anchors, used, installed or placed for the principal 
purpose of supporting Licensee's equipment or by any act of Licensee on or 
in the vicinity of Licensor's poles, including, but not by way of limitation, 
payments made under workmen's compensation laws. 
6Freund was certified from the Tenth Circuit Court to the Utah Supreme Court 
under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to address several unresolved 
questions of Utah law. 
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Id., at 371 (emphasis in original). The supreme court noted that the clause did not 
expressly mention the effect of any negligence of UP&L. However, the court ruled that 
the broad sweep of the language employed in the agreement clearly covered cases in 
which UP&L might be negligent, as the agreement covered "any and all claims, demands, 
causes of action, costs or other liabilities." Therefore, the court concluded that the clause 
expressed a clear and unequivocal intent of the parties that Jones indemnify UP&L from 
any and all liabilities, including liabilities arising from UP&L's negligence. 
More recently, in Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 26, f 19, the Utah Supreme 
Court has reemphasized the rules controlling indemnification agreements. Therein, the 
court stated as follows: 
In the context of negligence, we have consistently held that an "indemnity 
agreement which purports to make a party respond for the negligence of 
another should be strictly construed." Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 
793 P.2d 362, 370 (1990). In construing such agreements, we have looked 
at the "objectives of the parties and the surrounding facts and 
circumstances" in interpreting the contractual language. Id. "In general, the 
common law disfavors agreements that indemnify parties against their own 
negligence because 'one might be careless of another's life and limb, if there 
is no penalty for carelessness.'" Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, f 14 (citing 
Hvde v. Chevron U.S.A., 697 F.2d 614, 632 (5th Cir. 1983)). Parties 
seeking to exempt themselves from tort liability must "'clearly and 
unequivocally' express an intent to limit tort liability" within the contract. 
See Interwest 923 P.2d at 1356 (quoting DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663 
P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1983)). "Without such an expression of intent, 'the 
presumption is against any such intention, and it is not achieved by 
inference or implication from general language . . . .'" Id (citation omitted). 
Id at f 19. 
Under the Utah Supreme Court's instruction and reasoning in Freund and Bishop, 
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which appear to express the current state of Utah law, the Commercial Lease Agreement 
entered into by the Bonnemas and Mr. Shafizadeh is sufficiently clear and unequivocal to 
bar the Bonnemas' claims. The Bonnemas agreed that "Lessor [Mr. Shafizadeh] shall not 
be liable to the Lessee for any injury or damage... from any claims whatsoever . . . from 
any cause." (R. 10.) The parties' intent is clear and unequivocal in releasing Mr. 
Shafizadeh from all liability from any claim brought by the Bonnemas. Therefore, the 
Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court holding that the Bonnemas' claims failed 
as a matter of law. 
POINT H 
MR. SHAFIZADEH IS ENTITLED TO A RELEASE OF ALL OF 
THE BONNEMAS' CLAIMS AS WELL AS COMPLETE 
INDEMNIFICATION UNDER THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE 
COMMERCIAL LEASE AGREEMENT. 
Although the Bonnemas' position expressed in Point II of their Appellate Brief 
seems to be that, under Utah law, the concept of complete indemnification does not exist, 
that position is erroneous. The Bonnemas' other argument that a contractual 
indemnification provision does not bar a tort claim is also without support. The 
Bonnemas reliance on DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), is 
misplaced. Apparently, the Bonnemas interpret that case as meaning that tort claims 
cannot be barred through a contractual provision. (Brief of Appellant at 13.) 
The Bonnemas attempt to construe the holding of DCR too broadly. In DCR, the 
contract provision at issue was not the type of hold hamiless or indemnification provision 
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at issue in this case, but rather, was a liquidated damages clause, which contained no 
expression of an intent of the parties to limit the defendant's prospective liability in tort. 
The contractual clause at issue in DCR referred only to liability under the contract, and 
not to extra-contractual liability. 
However, DCR cannot be read to impose a ban on limiting or abrogating tort 
liability through a contractual indemnity or exculpatory provision. As stated above, 
Utah's law is such that courts must review the totality of the contract language and 
determine whether the clear intent of the parties is to limit liability, both under tort and 
under contract. If the language employed by the contract is clearly expressed and is 
unequivocal, tort and contract liability may clearly and properly be limited through a clear 
contract provision under Utah law. 
The Bonnemas also assert in Point III of their Brief that, in Utah, a party cannot 
contract away its own negligence. That position is incorrect. The Utah Supreme Court 
has made it clear that, although indemnification agreements are not favorites of the law, 
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.. 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983), the 
majority rule is that where the intention to indemnify a person from losses attributable to 
his own negligence is "clearly and unequivocally expressed" in the contract language, an 
indemnity agreement will be upheld. Id (citing Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen. 420 P.2d 
at 849 (Utah 1966); Union Pacific Railroad v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., at 913-14; 
Bamis v. Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207 (Utah 1965)). See also United States v. Seckinger. 
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397 U.S. 203, 211, 25 L. Ed. 2d 224, 90 S. Ct. 880 (1970). 
As shown in Russ, an expression of intent to contact away one's own negligence 
does not require that the exculpatory language refer expressly to the negligence of the 
indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify can be "clearly implied from the 
language and purposes of the entire agreement." Id. at 905. Reading the release, hold 
harmless and indemnification provisions contained in the Commercial Lease Agreement 
in harmony with the provision requiring the Bonnemas to name Mr. Shafizadeh as an 
insured under an insurance policy, there is a clear intent to relieve Mr. Shafizadeh of any 
damages to the Bonnemas' property, even if the damages were occasioned by his own 
negligence or due to the condition of the property. Because the contract language is 
sufficiently clear in this case, the trial court correctly granted Mr. Shafizadeh's motion to 
dismiss, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE BONNEMAS BREACHED THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
COMMERCIAL LEASE AGREEMENT REQUIRING THEM TO 
OBTAIN INSURANCE THAT WOULD COVER ALL OF THEIR 
DAMAGES. 
a. The Commercial Lease Agreement required the Bonnemas to 
procure insurance which would have covered all of their losses in 
this action, and the Bonnemas' failure to procure proper 
insurance requires them to step into the shoes of the insurer, and 
prohibits their claims against Mr. Shafizadeh. 
This Court has ruled that a landlord may, by contract, require a tenant to provide 
insurance to protect the leased property. GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P,2d 1157, 
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1164 (Utah App. 1994)("the landlord may simply by contract require the tenant to provide 
insurance.") The Commercial Lease Agreement required that the Bonnemas procure 
insurance to cover any damages to the premises and their own property, even if it was 
caused by a fire or by the condition of the property. The contract also required the 
Bonnemas to name Mr. Shafizadeh on the policy. The Bonnemas' admitted failure to 
procure proper insurance against damage by fire constitutes a material breach of the 
Commercial Lease Agreement. 
It is undisputed that the Commercial Lease Agreement required the Bonnemas to 
purchase property and fire insurance on the leased premises with liability limits of 
$1,000,000. (R. 10.) Such insurance was required to cover the building and personal 
property of the Bonnemas as follows: 
Lessee shall throughout the term of this Rental Agreement, at its sole cost 
and expense, provide and keep in force with responsible insurance 
companies satisfactory to Lessor and to any mortgagee under a mortgage or 
deed of trust constituting a lien upon the demised premises, public liability 
and property damage insurance. 
The liability limits of all said insurance shall be in the aggregate limits of at 
least one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars for any accident resulting in bodily 
injury to or the death of one or more persons, and consequential damages 
arising therefrom and liability or damage to all the property in the leased 
premises as well as liability to any employees or servants of Lessee or to 
any other person whomsoever arising out of or in connection with the 
Lessee's use of the rented premises or the condition of the rented premises. 
Fire and extended coverage insurance, including Vandalism and Malicious 
mischief endorsements, covering all trade fixtures, furniture, furnishings 
and equipment located on the leased premises, providing protection to the 
insurable value thereof, but no more than one hundred (100%) percent of 
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the replacement value thereof. 
Said policies of insurance shall name Lessor and the holder of such 
encumbrances with a certificate of insurance, executed by the insurer 
involved, which shall contain, in addition to the matters customarily set 
forth in such a certificate under standard insurance company practice an 
understanding by the insurer to give the Lessor and the holder of such 
encumbrances ten (10) days prior written notice of any cancellation, change 
in scope or modification of coverage of such policies. Lessee is to furnish 
Lessor with a Certificate of Liability Insurance within 30 days after-
commencement of this Agreement. 
(R. 10.) 
The Bonnema' contractual agreement to provide insurance to cover themselves 
and Mr. Shafizadeh against all losses caused by fire should be interpreted under normal 
rules of construction and not under a strict or heightened rule of construction. Freund v. 
Utah Power & Light Co.. 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court has 
addressed rules of interpreting contract provisions that require one party to purchase 
insurance for the benefit of another, stating that when: 
the parties have chosen by clear and unequivocal language to require one 
party to indemnify the other from liability arising from any cause including 
the indemnitee's own negligence, a further provision in that agreement to 
fund that indemnification by purchasing insurance should be construed as 
any other contractual language. 
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). This Court has also ruled 
that heightened construction is not warranted when interpreting agreements to purchase 
insurance for the benefit of another. See Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp.. 771 
P.2d at 667-68 (Utah App. 1989)(and cases cited therein.) 
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Despite the clear contractual language requiring the Bonnemas' duty to procure 
and maintain insurance on the premises to insure against damages caused by fire, and 
other hazards, they failed to procure and maintain such insurance. 
This Court has provided instruction regarding the effect of a party's failure to 
purchase insurance coverage for the benefit of another in Pickhoverv. Smith's 
Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1989). In that case, Yesco, a sign 
manufacturer purchased the assets of a competitor, Marvon. In the written purchase 
agreement, Yesco agreed to provide insurance coverage sufficient to protect Marvon 
against property damage, personal injury or death arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, use, service, transportation or installation of signs up to the amount of one 
million dollars. Yesco failed to purchase the insurance. 
In 1985, Pickhover was killed when a sign at Smith's Food King fell and struck 
him. Pickhover's widow brought a wrongful death action against Yesco, Marvon, and 
other defendants. Marvon cross-claimed and moved for summary judgment against 
Yesco asserting that the purchase agreement required Yesco to purchase insurance for 
Marvon, and that Yesco was liable for any judgment against Marvon up to one million 
dollars. The trial court granted Marvon's motion for summary judgment and Yesco 
appealed. 
The issue on appeal was whether Yesco was required to purchase insurance for 
Marvon that would cover Marvon's own negligence. Yesco argued that agreements to 
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purchase insurance were akin to indemnity agreements and should, therefore, be governed 
by rules of strict construction. Yesco further argued that when so construed, the 
agreement did not require Yesco to purchase insurance for Marvon because it did not 
expressly require Yesco to purchase insurance to cover Marvon's negligence. The Court 
of Appeals rejected Yesco's arguments and stated that agreements to provide insurance 
merely allocated an economic burden on one party to make payments to protect another 
after the parties decided to shift the risk of loss to an insurer. The court also stated that 
insurance of the type that was to be purchased by Yesco was commonly purchased to 
protect the named insured from his own negligence. Therefore, summary judgment for 
Marvon was affirmed. 
In a another recent case, that is analogous to the case before the Court, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a lessee's failure to purchase insurance to protect the 
leased premises barred its claims against the lessor. Planters Gin Co. v. Federal 
Compress & Warehouse Co.. Inc., 78 S.W.3d 885 (Tenn. 2002). Therein, defendant, a 
warehouser lessor, was sued by the lessee after a severe storm caused the leased 
building's roof to collapse which caused a water pipe to burst and flood the leased 
premises. The lease between the parties contained an indemnity clause and required the 
plaintiff lessee to insure the property warehoused in the leased premises. After suit was 
filed, the defendant moved for, and was granted, summary judgment on the ground that 
the lease agreement prevented recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant. The court 
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of appeals reversed the judgment, and the parties appealed to the supreme court. 
The court reviewed the lease agreement between the parties which provided as 
follows: 
Lessee agrees to hold harmless and indemnify Lessor from and against any 
liability or loss, including counsel fees incurred in good faith by the Lessor, 
arising out of any cause associated with Lessee's business or use of the 
premises. In addition, Lessee agrees to provide public liability insurance 
naming Lessor as additional insured to protect Lessor from risks 
customarily covered by such insurance, in amounts not less than $250,000 
per person and $500,000 per accident, and $100,000 for damage to 
property. Lessee also shall carry contents coverage on its contents with a 
waiver of subrogation clause as to Lessor. 
Id. 78 S.W.3d 885. 
Analyzing the above language employed by the parties, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court found no ambiguity and held that the plaintiff agreed to hold the lessor harmless for 
any liability or loss. Moreover, the court held that "the meaning of the provision is 
inescapable, particularity given the language by which [plaintiff] agrees to provide 
insurance to cover the contents stored in the warehouse...." Id. The court concluded that 
nothing in the contract limited the allocation of risk and reaffirmed summary judgment 
for the lessor. 
It is widely held that a party who agrees to procure the insurance and fails to do so 
assumes the position of the insurer and, thus, the risk of loss. 16A J. Appleman, Insurance 
Law & Practice § 8840 (1981); see also, Walker v. Vanderpool 302 S.E.2d 669 (Va. 
1983)(holding that where a plaintiff has contracted to protect the defendant from a loss by 
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procuring insurance, the plaintiff or his subrogee may not recover for that loss from the 
defendant even if the loss is caused by the defendant's negligence); see also Tidewater 
Equipment Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co.. 650 F.2d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 1981); Smith v. 
Ryan, 142 So.2d 139, 141 (Fla.App. 1962); Connor v. Thompson Construction & 
Development Co.. 166 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Iowa 1969); Midwest Lumber Co. v. Dwight E. 
Nelson Construction Co.. 196 N.W.2d377 (Neb. 1972). Temple Eastex, Inc. v. Old 
Orchard Creek Partners. Ltd.. 848 S.W.2d 724 (Tx. App. 1992). 
In this case, the Bonnemas agreed to purchase insurance to cover the premises as 
well as their own personal property, and yet breached their promise to purchase such 
insurance. The Bonnemas therefore, assumed the position of the insurer, and accepted the 
risk of loss through causes including fire damage. Because the Bonnemas agreed to 
procure insurance to cover the property, and to cover any personal property, their claims 
against Mr. Shafizadeh are barred as a matter of law. 
Moreover, in GNS Partnership this Court held that landlords and tenants are co-
insureds for subrogation purposes in the context of insuring the landlord's building. See 
id. at 1160-61. Because the Bonnemas and Mr. Shafizadeh are co-insureds, and the 
Bonnemas have, de facto, assumed the position of as the insurer on the property, they 
cannot bring a subrogation claim against Mr. Shafizadeh, as an insured. Therefore, the 
trial court correctly granted Mr. Shatlzadeh's motion to dismiss, and that judgment should 
be affirmed on appeal. 
27 
b. Even assuming that Mr, Shafizadeh breached the Commercial Lease 
Agreement, as alleged by the Bonnemas, the parties contractually 
agreed that the Bonnemas would bear the risk of providing insurance 
to remedy the breach. 
The Bonnemas alleged that Mr. Shafizadeh breached the Commercial Lease 
Agreement by not keeping the premises in a safe and clean condition. (Appellant's Brief 
at 10.) Assuming, arguendo, that allegation is correct, the trial court was correct in 
dismissing the Bonnemas' claims, because the parties had, from the moment the 
Commercial Lease Agreement was signed, agreed that the Bonnemas would bear the risk 
of such a breach. More precisely, the parties agreed that the Bonnemas would bear the 
burden of procuring and paying for insurance to cover the entire premises against various 
risks including fire and from the condition of the leased premises. (R. 10). Therefore, the 
trial court was correct in dismissing the Bonnemas' claim based on the language of the 
Commercial Lease Agreement. 
The undisputed facts show that the Bonnemas failed to procure the insurance as 
required by the Commercial Lease Agreement, and their alleged losses, which otherwise 
would have been covered by the insurance they were required to purchase, even if the 
losses were caused by the negligent breach of the lease agreement Mr. Shafizadeh, are 
not compensable by the Defendant. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that the 
provisions of the Commercial Lease Agreement relating to the Bonnemas' obligation to 
purchase insurance operated to bar their claims against Mr. Shafizadeh as a matter of law. 
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The Bonnemas have failed to show, on appeal, that the Court's ruling was erroneous, and 
therefore, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED NO RULING, JUDGMENT OR 
OPINION REGARDING THE ALLEGED INEFFECTIVENESS OF 
THE BONNEMAS5 COUNSEL, AND THAT ISSUE IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
The Bonnemas have raised several claims regarding the effectiveness of their 
counsel. However, the trial court issued no final ruling regarding the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of the Bonnemas' counsel, and the issue is not properly before the Court 
on appeal. Because there is no final ruling from the trial court on that issue, it is not 
properly before the Court. It is true that under Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, that an appellate court may remand a criminal case for entry of a finding of 
fact regarding ineffectiveness of counsel, but nothing in that rule allows a similar remand 
of a civil case. Therefore, there is no appealable issue regarding effectiveness of counsel 
before this Court. 
It appears that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is an issue that might 
have been raised by the Bonnemas in a post-judgment motion under either Rules 59 or 60 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the Bonnemas raised the issue for the 
first time on appeal. Because that issue was raised for the first time on appeal, it is not 
properly before the Court, and the Court should decline to address the issue. 
However, if the Court decides to address the issue, it should be examined under the 
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proper standard, which the Bonnemas' have failed to meet. To show ineffective 
assistance of counsel, "a [represented party] must show (1) that counsel's performance 
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but 
for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the trial would have been different." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995); see 
also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 
The Bonnemas mischaracterize Judge Hilder's comments with regard to the 
effectiveness of their counsel. Judge Hilder made no comment regarding the competency 
of the Bonnemas' counsel, nor did he criticize the oral argument presented by the 
Bonnemas' counsel. Morever, the Bonnemas mis-cite the record when they allege that 
Judge Hilder indicated that they should appeal based on the ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Additionally, the Bonnemas' counsel did not fail to appear at a hearing regarding 
Mr. Shafizadeh's motion for attorney's fees, because no such hearing was held. The issue 
was decided by the trial court without hearing. 
In short, all of the Bonnemas arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel 
fail to satisfy the criteria set out in the Smith and Templin cases. The trial court ruled on 
the issues presented to it, as a matter of law, after thorough briefing by both sides, and 
after adequate oral arguments of both counsel. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
ruling of the trial court. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN GRANTING MR. 
SHAFIZADEH'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
As a preliminary matter, this is a civil case, governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (and Appellate Procedure), and the Bonnemas' reference to Rule 30 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure had no applicability to this case. Additionally, the 
Bonnemas incorrectly cite Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Appellant's 
Brief at 18.) Therefore, the Court should disregard those inapplicable and/or non-existent 
rules in rendering its decision on appeal. 
The Bonnemas assail the ruling of the trial court on the ground that it allegedly did 
not hear all of the evidence against Mr. Shafizadeh. However, the matter was fully 
briefed, and the district court did hear and consider all of the evidence necessary to make 
a ruling regarding the Commercial Lease Agreement. The trial court's decision was 
based on the necessary evidence, including the Commercial Lease Agreement, which the 
court had obviously carefully considered in making its decision. Furthermore, the 
Bonnemas, through counsel, were given an adequate opportunity to present all of their 
arguments in oral and written form to the court before a ruling was made. The Bonnemas 
have failed to present any additional or further evidence on appeal which would result in 
a different ruling on the Commercial Lease Agreement. Therefore, they have failed to 
show that the trial court erred in making its ruling, and the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
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POINT VI 
THE BONNEMAS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON 
ANY ISSUE. 
The Bonnemas' demand for a new trial misses the point of the trial court's ruling, 
and does not appear to be grounded in Utah law. The trial court carefully considered the 
covenants made by the contracting parties in the Commercial Lease Agreement, and 
implicitly ruled as a matter of law, that even if Mr. Shafizadeh was negligent, or even if 
he breached the contract, the parties had previously agreed that the Bonnemas would bear 
the risk of those breaches. 
As shown above, the language of the Commercial Lease Agreement, and not an 
evidentiary rule, including res ipsa loquitur J controls in this case. Therefore, even if the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied in this case, the contractual promises by the 
Bonnemas to defend, indemnify, hold harmless, and provide insurance have been chosen 
by the parties as the remedies for any damage or injury to the premises resulting from any 
cause. The Bonnemas have not shown any right or authority which would allow the 
Court to grant them a "new trial" and therefore, the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
"Res ipsa loquitur is essentially an evidentiary rule that allows an inference of 
negligence to be drawn when human experience provides a reasonable basis for 
concluding that an injury probably would not have happened if due care had been 
exercised." Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 721 (Utah 1985). 
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POINT VII 
MR, SHAFIZADEH IS ENTITLED TO A FURTHER AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IN DEFENDING AGAINST THIS 
APPEAL. 
Utah law is well-settled that a party who is entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
may recover an additional reasonable amount of fees incurred in successfully defending 
an appeal. See, Centurian Corp. v. Cripps. 624 P.2d 706, 713 (Utah 1981) (granting 
prevailing party's request for attorney fees pursuant to contractual agreement and 
remanding for determination of amount). The majority of jurisdictions have recognized 
that the contractual obligation to pay attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a contract 
should include those incurred on appeal. Management Servs. Corp. v. Development 
Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 408-409 (Utah 1980). This is also the accepted rule in Utah. See, 
vL 
The Commercial Lease Agreement contains, in Paragraph 22, a provision for 
attorney's fees which states as follows: 
If Lessor or Lessee shall bring any action for any relief against any other 
arising out of this Agreement, or to recover possession of said property, 
whether such action progresses to judgment or not, the losing party shall 
pay to the successful party, in addition to other relief granted, its costs and 
expenses including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(R. 12.) It was based on the above language in the parties' contract that the district court 
correctly awarded Mr. Shafizadeh reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $1,756.98. 
(R. 286-87.) If this Court sees fit to affirm the judgment of the trial court, Mr. Shafizadeh 
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requests that the Court remand the case to the district court solely for a determination of 
the reasonable amount of attorney's fees incurred by Mr. Shafizadeh on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct in dismissing the Bonnemas' claims against Mr. 
Shafizadeh and in granting his attorney's fees. Well-established Utah law supports Mr. 
Shafizadeh's position that the language of the Commercial Lease Agreement is clear and 
unambiguous in showing that the intent of the parties to require the Bonnemas to defend, 
indemnify and hold harmless Mr. Shaifzadeh against any and all claims whatsoever 
occurring from any cause. Those contractual provisions coupled with the Bonnemas' 
contractual promises to provide insurance to cover the premises and Mr. Shafizadeh, 
express a clear and unequivocal intent on the part of the Bonnemas sufficient to bar any 
claim that they brought against Mr. Shafizadeh. Therefore, the Court should affirm the 
decision of the trial court, remand the case solely for a determination of reasonable 
attorney's fees in favor of Mr. Shafizadeh, and award Mr. Shafizadeh his costs on appeal. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 2004. 
STRONG & HANNI ~ 
Bv / / ^ <• J ^'<& * S*Z.J 
Peter H. Barlow 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Masoud Shafizadeh 
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Appendix A 
3 - 2 6 - 0 2 0 2 : 4 3 P K e v i f r e l a y 801 1 1 - 4 9 2 3 
S3CT 16 2Q01 ll:04flM MRVERICK APPRAISERS CO. I 8012552021 
COMMERCIAL LEASE AC-KEEZvJXNT 
1. PARTIES. This Eental Agreement ("Agreement") is dared February 25. 2000 
and entered inio by and between Masoud Shafeadeh. OXes-sor*) and Steve and Tori 
Boimema (^'Lessee"). 
A 2. .PREMISES Subject to the terms, covenants and conditions hereinafter set 
§fy forth, Lessor "hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor,-that 
£§ c e r t a^ [ 1 °ffice space rffi^'g*ftg p^ approximately 1.820 square feet in area located ax 
^ 8029 South State'. s 5 ^ t T J t S T 8 4 0 9 3 (hereinafter the "premises"), ^Hch premises aie 
situated in that certain building- ("the Building. 
3. XSEM* This Agreement shall be for thirty six months coinjoiendng on the 1st 
day of March, 2000 and terminating on the 28H day of February, 2003. 
\A^ 4. JffiNT Lessee agrees to pay :o Lessor, as rental for the premises, the sum of 
S 1400.00 (fourteen hundred dollars) per month, ia advance, on the first day of 
' / # ^ f e a c h 'mDTTlJroegnnmg on the 3gc day of March 2000. If any amount due under 
^^^ this lease is not received by Lessor on the 5th day of any month Lessee shall pay 
ta the Lessor a late fee equal to 10% of the rent due and a charge of $10.00 a day 
for every day late after the 5th of the month, Rent is ta increase 5% per year. 
3. SECUIfflT DEPOSIT- SI,400 as security deposit for the performance oi its 
obligations.. In the event of a default by Lessee, Lessor may. at its option, apply such 
part of the deposit as may necessary to cure the default. If Lessor does so, Lessee shall 
re-deposit with Lessox the amount so applied so that Lessee will have the full security 
deposit on hand during the term hereof. Upon the termination of this Lease, Lessor r 
shall return the then remaining balance of the deposit if Lessee has fulfilled its J^* 
obligations hereunder. 
6. USE. The premises shall be occupied and used exclusively for Hair/Nail Salon. , 
and for no other purposes without the written consent of Lessor. Lessee shall not da or ^ k 
permit anything: to be done in or about the premises, nor bring or Iceep anything -^ 
therein, which -will in any way increase the existing rate oi or affect any fire or other ^ 
insurance upon the building or any of its content, or cause a cancellation of any^. ^ 
insurance policy covering said building- or any part thereof or any of its contents. 
Lessee shall not do or permit anything to be done in or about the premises which mil in 
any way obstruct or interfere with che rights of other tenants or occupants of the 
building, or injure or annoy them, or use or allow the premises to be used for any 
improper, immoral, unlawful or objectionable purpose, nor shall Lessee cause, maintain 
or permix any nuisance in, or~about the premises. Lessee shall not commit ox.suffer to 
be committed, any waste in or upon the premise. 
c 
Lessor reserves the right to the use of BR exterior walls, windows and the roof of the 
premises, and Lessee shaL not paint, hang- or affix any signs, advertisements or other 
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Fixe and extended coverage insurance, including Vandalism and Malicious mischief 
endorsements, covering-all trade fixtures, furniture, furnishings and equipment located 
tLT, T f T ? ? ^ 8 P , r o v i d i n ? P^tecuon to the insurable value thereof but no more 
tnan one hundred (100%) percent ofthe replacement value thereof. 
Said policies of insurance shall name Lessor and aie holder of such encumbrances with 
*fJ**nC!tte fmsu*^> executed hy the insurer involved, which shall contain, in 
addition to the maters customarily set forth in such a certificate under standard 
insurance company practice an understanding by the insurer to give Lessor and the 
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S T * r 5-PE **?*&&<*• o f coverage of suc.1 ooiicies. Lessee is to furnish Lessor 
i S e r n e n T " 1 ^ ^ ^ l E S U i a i l C e **** 2 0 d a ^ ^ "mmencemeut of this 
F ^ ^ f T r ^ 2 ^ • P r o J v l d e d t h a t L e s 5 e e ^ n « ^ default hereunder. Lessor shall 
ar,^ 0 _ _ ^ _ . _ _ = " "" reasonable quananes of sras. water, elsczncn-. hea-
*. vc.w ^ e v r _ i r c l a y
 s o £ - ~ i a _ 4 9 2 3 
OCT i s 20Q1 U:04flM MAVERICK RPPRfllSERS CO. I 8012SS2921 
^ c ^ f i ^ ^ S ^ « » ^ « ~ ««-»«* milure to furxush 
and ^Ilp^de ^ " S ^ ^ ^ * * ^ " * " * ^ to * ' ? ^ e 
b ^ c ^ f ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ p S M ^ & the event che ^
 o r 
casualty covered bv e S S " ™ P- ^ ^ °C ^ ^ ^ * &* « other 
w n S t £ i ™ ^'+u r r ? e Q e x a J ?°ven™eiit Lessor shall, with due diligence 
S S S % ^ L e a S e s L a J 1 r e m a i j l * *ifl force and effect L e a s - ^ n K ' 
entitled to a proportionate abatement of r w W T
 r-„ - ^ea^ee snail be 
r ? ™ ? * * J u t h e e V e n t & e d a m a - e o r destruction is the result of a 
from the data of such d L S ^ * * " " ^ d e C O O n * L e s 5 e e m t b i a 3 0 ^ 
r e a d a b l e tmee tone in , t e r r a h ^ t f
 t 0 mOTCCI ^ ^ ^ ^ f l ? " 
£ S Z S £ i f ^ ° l W m d l ^ P 1 ^ 3 ^ a part aird to stow the u i e S l D 
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IS. This section *vas purposely deleted. 
19. DEFAULT The occurrence of any of the following; acts or omissions during- the 
term oi this Lease shall constitute a default hereunder: 
(a) The failure of Lessee to make any p ayments of rent when due or to make 
any other payments specified herein, if such failure is not corrected within 10 days 
arter written notice thereof is given by Lessor; 
_ (b) The failure of Lessee to observe and perform any other terms, covenant or 
condition sf nhis^ease to be performed by Lessee when such failure is nor corrected 
within 30 days after written notice diereof is grveu lv Lessor, provided, however, that if 
such faimre cannot be corrected with reasonable dili-ence within 30 davs after notice 
thereof, ^essor shall not be entitled to enforce the Lessor's remedies hersunde- if Lessee 
commences the corrections of said failure within 30 davs period and thereafter 
diligently prosecutes the same to completion; 
(c) The filing; of a pennon in bankruptcy by or against Lessee, che adjudication 
at lessee as bankrupt or insolvent by any court, the appointment of a trustee or 
receiver for all or substantially all of Lessee's assets ox business, the maldng- by Lessee 
of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or the attachment or execution of Lessee's 
leasehold interest therein: 
Cd) The abandonment or vacating- of the premises by Lessee. 
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shall have the following right* in addition to any ocher remedies available co Lessor at 
Law or in equity: 
(a) Lessor shall have the option to immediately terminate both this Lease and 
Leasee's rights to possession cfthe premises by giving ^rattan norice of such intention 
to Leasee and thereupon. Lessee shall immediately and peacefully surrender possession 
of the premises to lessor and if lessee shall fail to surrender possession, Lessor may re-
enter and repossess the premises and remove alipersona and property therefrom, such 
property to be stored in a public warehouse or elsewhere at the expense of Lessee. If 
this Lease is so tenninated. Lessor shall be entitled to recover from lessee all rent and 
other sums due hereunder from lessee which may be unpaid on the date of the Lease 
termination, together "with interest thereon ar the rate of 10% per annum, pius all rent 
and other sums "which ^rould have accrued and are unpaid hereunder, commencing 
from the date of the Lease termination and continuing for the balance of the term of 
this Lease, less the amount if any, which Lasses yiwes could be mitigated. 
(b) Lessor shall have the option to re-enter and repossess the premises, 'without 
terminating' this Lease, and to remove all persons and property therefrom, such 
property to be stored, hi a public warehouse or ebewnere at the expense of Lessee. If 
this Lease is not terminated. Lessor may from time w time recover all rent and other 
payments as they become due or may re-let the premises or any part thereon upon such 
terms and conditions as Lessor may deem advisable, and such re-letting shall not 
constitute a termination of this Lease. Rentals received by Lessor from any such re-
letting shall be applied first to the cost of re-letting next to the payment of the cost of 
any necessary repairs or alterations and then to the payment of rent or other charges 
due hereunder. The residue, if any, shall be held by Lessor and applied to future rent 
payments as they became due. Any deficiencies between the rent received from the re-
letting" and the rent and other amounts due from lessee hereunder, shall be paid to 
lessor by Lessee immediately upon Lessor's demand. 
21 HOLDOVER TENANCY. If Lessee holds possession of the premises after the 
expiration of the term of this Lease, Lessee shall become a tenant from month to month 
upon the terms, covenants and conditions herein specified and at a monthly rental 
equivalent to the rent paid oy Lessee at the expiration of the term of the Lease 
pursuant to Paragraph 5, plus a 10% increase- Such tenancy shall continue until 
terminated by Lessor, or until Lessee shall have given Lessor at least one months prior 
written notice of intention to terminate such tenancy. 
22. ATTORNEYS FEES If Lessor cr Lessee shall bring any action for any relief. 
against the other arising out of this Agreement, or to recover possession of said 
property whether such action progresses to judgment or not the losing part}* shall pay 
to the successful party, in addition to any other relief granted, its cost and expenses 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
23. NQN-.WAIYER. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed aa 
waiving any of Lessor's rights under the laws of the State of Utah. 
24. NOTTCBS. Any norice required or permitted to be given under this Agreement 
shall b e in writing and may be given by p ersonal delivery or sent postagB prepaid by 
registered or certified mail addressed ro Lessee at the premises and the Lesser at 1620 
East Langdale Circle. Sandy. Utah. 54093 or to such other person or place as either 
parry hereto may from time :c m ? nouiy the other party in a norice. 
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domain, in whole or substantially in parr, fox public purposes, then this Rental 
Agreement, at the option of the Lessor, shall forthwith cease and terminate, and the 
current rent shall be properly apportioned to the date of such taking and in any such 
event Lessor shall receive the entire award for the lands and improvements 30 taken, 
and Lessee shall make no claim against Lessor for compensation in connection with the 
taking referred to above. 
26. SUBORDINATION, This Rental Agreement and all of the rights of tenant 
hereunder are and shall be subject and Subordinate to the lien of any mortgage or deed 
of trust now or hereafter placed on the demised premises, and 10 any and all renewals, 
modifications, consolidaaons, replacements, extensions or substitutions thereof. 
27 AMENDMENT. ADDENDUM MODIFICATION, Any Amendments, 
Addendum, Modifications- and/or other Supplements, if any be hereto attached, are 
made a pare hereof, and shall be binding: upon the parties hereto, and of any provision 
of said Amendments. Addendum, Modifications, ar Supplements shall conflict in any 
manner with any other provision of this Eental Agreement, the provision of 
Amendment, Addendum, Modification or Supplement shall prevail. 
28. Substitute Premises. This section was purposely deleted, 
29. ENTITLED LIABILITY OF LESSOR. Lessor shall not be personally or 
individually liable or obligated under this rental agreement to Lessee, or for any such 
action or inaction on part of Lessor. Rather, any and all such liability and obligations 
of Lessor shall be limited to and paid solely from said office building property and the 
rents, issues, and profits therefrom. 
30. TIME OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence of &d* lease. IN WITNESS 
WHEREOF. Lessor and Lessee have executed this lease. 
31. Tenant Improvements. Landlord to provide space in "AS IS" condition 
Tenant to be responsible fox their own improvements. 
32, Signals. Tenant to be allowed signage on t ie front of the building at tenants 
expense, with Landlord approval,. 
Lessee Signature 
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"Lessor", 
— v L/itt 
Lessor Sigu^nrre 
fillet 
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